Bush's Missile Defense

by Emmett Hogan

Throughout his election campaign last year, then-Governor George W. Bush made National Missile Defense (NMD) a centerpiece of his defense proposals. Now that Candidate Bush has become President Bush, the controversial program – which aims at developing a defensive shield of anti-ballistic weaponry around America to shoot down incoming nuclear missiles – is back in favor in Washington, and in a big way. The current administration is, unquestionably, the most pro-missile defense administration to date. Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice both enthusiastically endorse the plan. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld chaired a commission that reported to Congress in 1998, strongly endorsing the development of such systems. And, of course, President Bush and Vice President Cheney both stand firmly in the ranks of NMD’s supporters. President Reagan’s administration was never as united on the issue.

Although NMD is an outgrowth of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (popularly known as ‘Star Wars’), it is remarkably different in scope. SDI sought to develop space-based interceptors that would utilize laser technology to shoot down nuclear missiles in the boost phase (shortly after launch, before the missiles have left the atmosphere). This would destroy the missiles before the Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles – or MIRVs – break off from the missile itself and speed towards their respective targets; it would also destroy the missile before it could launch decoys. Yet such a program has obvious technical problems. NMD was an attempt by the Clinton administration to scale back the concept of missile defense to one of more feasible dimensions. Consequently, NMD would use land-based and, possibly, sea-based missiles to intercept incoming nuclear missiles.

Despite the Bush administration’s obvious desire to develop NMD, serious obstacles remain. Those obstacles revolve around two dimensions: feasibility and diplomatic repercussions.

The most optimistic projections for the partial deployment of NMD suggest that theater-based systems protecting certain regions could be online by 2006. A number of variables influence this, however. Last year, President Clinton decided to hold off on making a decision on NMD deployment after two missile-based tests failed to hit their targets. Mr. Bush, however, has decided to resume testing later this year, with a test slated for May or June. Furthermore, his administration is actively supporting research and has increased funding to this end. Within days of taking over in Washington, the Bush administration renewed through late 2007 its contract with Boeing, who leads the development efforts (the old contract would have expired this month). Secretary Rumsfeld has ordered a complete review of our armed forces and is seeking ways to incorporate NMD into our existing force structures.

Although the failed tests of last year received widespread attention, a number of successes have gone unnoticed. These successes have given renewed legitimacy to the SDI laser-based model, which the Bush administration now says is its ultimate goal. Laser-based systems would, in theory, be extremely accurate, and would have the added advantage of being able to intercept missiles in the boost-phase before they enter the atmosphere. Such systems are, however, extremely costly, and getting them to function properly in space is no simple task. But last summer, Israeli and American engineers successfully used a tactical high-energy laser (THEL) to shoot down Katyusha rockets in limited theater-based tests. Extrapolating such a device to space-based defenses will be difficult; the parallels between the tests and a realistic missile defense is weak. But the signs are very encouraging to NMD’s proponents.

In the meantime, the Bush administration is looking into alternative measures of defending against missile attack. Navy officials are proposing upgrades of Aegis destroyer missiles and placing those destroyers in the Sea of Japan; that way, if North Korea launches a nuclear missile, ship-based interceptor missiles could shoot down those missiles from nearby. The proposal is fraught with logistical problems, but the Navy expects to have the plan in operation by 2003. Given that North Korea is projected to have missiles capable of hitting the continental United States by 2002, this proposal is receiving much attention.

A clue as to how seriously the administration takes the issue of missile defense may arise over the next month. For a missile defense system to be operable by 2006, work needs to begin immediately on a new radar base, to be situated on the Alaskan island of Shemya. This radar is needed no matter the size and scale of proposed systems, be they theater weapons or laser-based strategic weapons. Mr. Bush will have to authorize the construction of a radar there soon, since because of the climate, it can only be built during the summer. If Bush gives the order to start construction on Shemya, it will be a strong signal that he and his administration are serious about the development of NMD.

Many of the technical concerns about developing NMD have an international component, which complicates matters somewhat for the President.

A radar system at Thule, in Greenland, would need updating for any level of missile defense to work. The Danish government, which has been somewhat critical of American efforts to develop missile defense, has not yet said whether or not it will allow this upgrade. Foreign Minister Mogens Lykketoft, recognizing Denmark’s precarious position between America, its other Nato allies, and Russia, says that his country will decide "when the time is right."

Another radar base in Fylingdales, northern England, is crucial to NMD development. Prime Minister Tony Blair has become somewhat amenable to American plans to upgrade that site. Mr. Bush has impressed to the British that integrating the radar complex at Fylingdales would ensure that Britain would be protected by an American missile defense.

Indeed, the Bush administration has made extended protection an integral part of its pitch to Western European states. Mr. Rumsfeld, in a recent press briefing, noted that the forward deployment of forces – presumably, in Western Europe – would allow American allies to "feel equally secure to the extent that is possible." This willingness to extend the protection of NMD beyond America’s shores heralds a markedly different approach from the Clinton administration’s approach, and may make NMD an easier sell in Europe.

Countries like Denmark or England, of course, are not the main opponents of the development of missile defense systems. Aware of Mr. Bush’s strong stance on the issue, both Russia and China have expressed strong concern.

Russian objections are not new; they are virtually indistinguishable from the Soviet-era objections to SDI’s initial incarnation. Russian diplomats warn that the development of a missile defense system would prove immensely destabilizing, leading to a new nuclear arms race. Furthermore, they argue, missile defense would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), a cornerstone of the nuclear doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The treaty explicitly prohibits the development of NMD.

The issue of the ABMT has been a thorny problem for NMD’s proponents since its early days. The Reagan administration used a highly legalistic argument, saying that the treaty allowed development, but not deployment. Nevertheless, withdrawal from the treaty would seriously aggravate Russia, whose nuclear deterrence would be less credible in light of an American defense against it. Mr. Rumsfeld, however, describes the treaty as a "straitjacket", and would no doubt be willing to exchange it for a missile defense system. In an interview this week with Jane’s Defense Quarterly, a senior administration official stated that "the treaty obviously stands in the way. So it has to be replaced or eliminated or fundamentally altered. No one in this administration would ever suggest that it ever should be violated, but there is the withdrawal clause that is our legal right to exercise if we so choose."

Moscow has taken a number of steps since Mr. Bush’s inauguration to halt the march towards NMD. They have stepped up ties with Iran, a rogue state against which an American NMD would supposedly defend. In early March, President Mohammad Khatami visited Moscow, where Mr. Putin announced that he would resume sales of arms to Iran, which have been on hiatus for five years. Furthermore, Mr. Putin suggested that he would help the Iranians to develop a nuclear reactor; this move has many Americans worried that the Russians are giving Iran the capacity to build nuclear bombs.

Perhaps the strangest move Moscow has taken so far has been to suggest a regional missile defense system for Europe, in lieu of the American strategic concept. In a February meeting with Nato Secretary General Lord Robertson, Mr. Putin urged that Russia and Nato jointly assess the threat of nuclear attack from rogue states, and then deploy regional, land-based interceptor missiles designed to shoot down limited numbers of missiles. This, argues Russia, would not seriously violate the ABMT, and would guarantee that Russia’s nuclear deterrence threat is credible – since such a system would never be able to cope with the onslaught of a large Russian nuclear attack.

Administration officials dismiss this proposal as a red herring, designed to peel Nato countries away from the NMD camp. They do, however, express optimism that Russia is now willing to discuss the issue at all – an entirely new development.

If a new arms race results from the development of missile defenses, Russia would most likely not be able to afford it. China, however, could; and it is from China that the other main objection has been coming. China announced an almost 18% increase in its defense budget for this year. The Chinese finance minister, Xiang Huaicheng, cited the need "to adapt to drastic changes in the military situation of the world and prepare for defense and combat given the conditions of modern technology." NMD’s detractors say that the Bush administration’s ardent desire to develop missile defenses led the Chinese to take this step; they see this as the beginning of a prolonged arms race with China, which could have repercussions for two other regional nuclear powers, India and Pakistan. But Mr. Bush has undoubtedly taken a more hawkish stance towards China than did Mr. Clinton. And, until this week, the administration was seriously considering the sale of Aegis destroyers, equipped with highly sophisticated radar equipment, to Taiwan (that decision was deferred on Tuesday). Any, and most likely all, of these considerations could have led the Chinese to such measures.

Whether or not American insistence on the development of NMD will prove destabilizing remains to be seen. For the time being, Mr. Bush is adamant, and is likely to remain so. European allies will likely side with America, especially if – as the administration is promising – the defense will be extended to them. How the debate over NMD will play out, then, depends largely on whether or not it is feasible and how China and Russia will react.