The Terrible New Hazing Policy

by Alexander Wilson

In recent weeks two major proposals have been announced with little fanfare by committees established to review the College’s policy on hazing and its judicial framework for student organizations. The muted response from students, and student leaders in particular, is unfortunate, for in combination the proposals present a significant threat to the future of student groups in general, and Greek organizations in particular.

Neither proposal is irretrievably flawed, and both create the possibility for substantial improvement in College policy. As they currently stand, however, the result of their adoption would be an arbitrary system tailor-made for the removal from campus of those student groups the administration finds undesirable.

The more troubling of the two is, by far, the proposed policy on hazing. Current policy, based on New Hampshire law, is mainly limited to a ban on activities likely to cause physical harm. Even national Greek organizations generally concede that to be too narrow a definition.

Still, to define hazing in a more expansive way—while still limiting the definition to a reasonable set of prohibitions—is difficult. Like pornography, the clearest standard is that you know it when you see it. The task of the hazing policy committee was clearly not an easy one and, sadly, proved beyond their grasp.

Imagine that you have just joined an organization. Almost immediately you are informed that there will be a new member trip into the woods around Hanover. Attendance is not required but it is strongly encouraged, and almost every other new member is going to go. The older members tell you that you definitely shouldn’t miss it. After two nights in the woods, you return—having been forced to sleep on the ground in the rain, and hike mile after mile. On the way back you tripped and sprained your ankle.

Under Dartmouth’s proposed statute, you may have just been hazed. If you’re a new pledge in a fraternity, your house may face charges and possible derecognition. Of course, you might also be a freshman returning from your DOC trip.

But is the seriousness of the activity really changed by the organization that sponsors it? In both cases, it’s about helping new members relate to one another and receive an introduction to the organization. Whether the association is accused of hazing in a judicial proceeding depends entirely on the jurors’ preconceptions about the group, its intentions, and its merits—it’s a subjective process, and unfair, and precisely what the new hazing statute would create.

The committee defines “hazing” as: “Any action taken or situation created as part of initiation to or continued membership in a student organization, which 1) produces or could be expected to produce mental or physical discomfort, harm or stress, embarrassment, harassment, or ridicule, or 2) which violates College policy, fraternal/sororal policy, or law.”

Mental discomfort, embarrassment, and ridicule are pretty difficult to regulate. A limitless number of social situations produce them. Yet, an organization that holds an event and does not safeguard all members’ feelings against discomfort and embarrassment is susceptible to official college sanction. Recently, the 2003 Class Council held a bachelor-bachelorette auction to raise money for charity. Among those auctioned were members of the Council who would likely not have been there except for that membership. According the letter of the new hazing statute, it could be proven that the Council committed a hazing violation. One low selling price, and the auctionee’s resultant embarrassment, and the Council could be derecognized.

One naturally regards the possibly of the Class Council being derecognized for hazing as ridiculous on its face. Dartmouth, however, has launched some pretty absurd hazing investigations. Apparently, the Dodecaphonics a cappella group welcomes new members by waking them up in the middle of the night and taking them out to a diner. Last term, the Student Activities Office caught wind of these activities, and informed the Dodecs that they were being reviewed on charges of hazing. Linda Kennedy, Associate Director of Student Activities, interrogated the group’s director as to the circumstances of their new member initiation.

It’s easy to dismiss hazing charges against a cappella groups as absurd, and Linda Kennedy as silly, but when one considers student groups that the College actively disfavors, such as Greek societies, the issue assumes a sharper focus. The hazing policy becomes a pretext for sanctioning any organization, a weapon with which it’s possible to beat any student group into line. It’s unlikely that the committee ever intended the policy that way, but it apparently never considered the possibility, either.

The committee attempted to clarify their concept of hazing in a more detailed commentary on the definition, but the expanded description is of little use in limiting the range of potential charges under the hazing code. “Activities that represent a disregard for another person’s dignity,” writes the committee. It may be that some subjectivity is required in the judicial process, but the committee’s platitudes render the guidelines so vague as to be meaningless. As far as judicial fairness is concerned, the committee allows an exceptionally large amount of latitude in interpretation.

“Almost anything that new members are required to do that is not required of more senior members is likely to constitute hazing,” they add. Not only would that regulation immediately disqualify many organizations at Dartmouth from recognition, it doesn’t exactly prepare students for the real world. I have many acquaintances who have gone on from the Hanover plain to both the public and private sectors, but I have yet to hear from anyone who has exactly the same responsibilities as his boss.

A list of examples of hazing is an important step in the right direction, but it remains too nebulous, too broad, and too removed from the judicial process. Along with legitimate examples of hazing such as coerced alcohol consumption, paddling, and creation of excessive fatigue are included items like “activities that would unreasonably interfere with students other activities or obligations (academic, extracurricular, family, religious, etc.)” and “engaging in public stunts and buffoonery,” which stretch the boundaries of hazing. One man’s buffoonery is another’s post-finals blowing off of steam.

Nor do I imagine I am the only Dartmouth student whose various organizational commitments regularly interfere unreasonably both with each other, and with everything else. When time management difficulties become a violation of official hazing policy, there must be cause for concern among those who cherish their freedom to take on too many things at once and learn to cope with it.

The committee maintains that the examples only constitute hazing when intended to “mistreat, intimidate or humiliate the participant.” The intent of the organization transforms an otherwise acceptable activity into illegal hazing. This is an important restraint on the hazing definition’s broad reach. It also, however, begs the question of how one is to determine organizational intent, especially in light of long-standing debates over, say, the role of pledging in Greek organizations. The perception of those sitting in judgment becomes central to adjudication—whether they think pledging really is constructive, or just cruel and stupid.

The Group Adjudication Committee drafted a proposal to create a body to investigate and judge violations of the College’s Standards of Conduct committed by student organizations. Replacing the current system, in which organizations are judged by the administrative department under which they fall, the GAC proposal, if adopted, would be a vast improvement. The GAC was also wise enough to allow the departments to maintain jurisdiction, often exercised by student judicial committees, over violations of department, but not College, policy.

There remains a flaw in the GAC proposal, however, one with major implications when considered in light of the hazing policy. The composition of the new Organizational Adjudication Committee (OAC), would be nine faculty, twelve students, and six administrators. Six of the students would be elected and six chosen by the Dean of the College.

The problem with the OAC arrangement is simple: students are underrepresented. Fifteen non-student votes, as opposed to twelve student votes, eliminates the possibility that judgments will be those of students’ peers, a principle that has been admirably upheld by the administration in other areas. Worse, only six students will actually have been chosen by other students.

In no area of the College’s administration is it more important that students determine who will exercise their authority than on a judicial board of this nature. Under the GAC proposal, there will nearly four times as many members chosen by the administration as chosen by the students. That imbalance is incompatible with the appearance, and reality, of impartiality that a committee charged with the ability to ban student groups must possess.

Insufficient student representation is troubling enough, but it’s made all the worse by the faculty block that will also be represented. The OAC will likely be responsible for determining the future of certain Greek organizations. The faculty have voted unanimously on a number of occasions—most recently two years ago—for the total abolition of the Greek system. The faculty view is that Greek societies are fundamentally narrow-minded and anti-intellectual, and exist solely to promote destructive and puerile behavior. With all due respect to Dartmouth’s professors, can one truly believe the nine who join the committee will be likely to make impartial judgments on hazing cases involving Greek houses? These are, after all, cases where the entire issue will boil down to whether committee members believe the intentions of Greek organizations are, at root, positive or negative.

Put the two proposals together and the result is alarming: A vague, broad hazing definition, in which determination of guilt doesn’t depend on concrete rules—not even on less clear but still ascertainable criteria like consent of the participants—but on a subjective judgment by OAC members as to the intent of the organization. And that judgment won’t be made by the accused’s peers, but by a majority of committee members who may well have neither understanding of, nor appreciation for, the activities or organization in question.

Only the truly naïve can be unaware that the new hazing policy is primarily, though not solely, concerned with behavior in Greek houses. And the anti-Greek bias of the faculty and administration makes the OAC as currently constituted seem a less than ideal forum for Greek societies to respond to hazing allegations.

The hazing policy, however, is not solely a Greek issue; it will affect all student groups. Many, if not most, are currently in technical violation. Penalties for all student organizations must reflect the judgment of their peers. The proposed policy allows the College to disband any student association that may fall into disfavor among official Dartmouth. It’s crucial that the College have recourse only to fair and objective procedures in wielding such substantial authority.

Dartmouth is in a period of making major changes; it’s understandable that, for all the good intention of those working on them, mistakes may be made. But, as Dean of the College James Larimore reviews these proposals, it is crucial he not ignore those mistakes. Will the College misuse the flaws in the proposals to violate what should be untouchable rights of students to associate, and to be dealt with fairly in disciplinary hearings? Rightly, most students very much doubt it. But many aren’t quite sure, and nothing is less likely to remove that uncertainty than to institute these proposals without ensuring that the system is as fair, as objective, and as dedicated to an equal role for students as it can possibly be.

Not to mention that it happens to be right.